Introduction

The open access regime existing in the harvesting of marine fishery resources in our country warrants stronger emphasis on invoking technological innovations as well as management paradigms that reconcile livelihood issues with concerns on resource conservation. Innovations do not happen in a socio-political vacuum. It is the extent of partnership between the research and the client system that decides the fate of any technology in terms of its adoption or rejection. Rational utilization of common property resources for sustainable development without endangering the environment is possible through community participation. For more than 6 million fishers and fish farmers, fisheries are a source of livelihood in India. Fisheries sector has recorded faster growth as compared to the agricultural sector in all the decades and is contributing in a significant way to the economic growth of the nation. The vast Exclusive Economic Zone of 2.02 million sq. km of ocean under the possession of India is more than two third of its land area. Marine fishing has been considered as a primary livelihood option since time immemorial, for the occupants of the coastal belt in India. The marine fishery resources of the country include a coastline of 8129 km with numerous creeks and saline water areas, an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 2.02 million km² which are suitable for capture as well as culture fisheries. The annual harvestable marine fishery resources in the Indian EEZ have been estimated at about 3.93 million tones constituting more than 50 per cent demersal, 43 per cent pelagic and 6 per cent oceanic groups. (Rao Syda, 2011) Moreover it supports the deprived coastal community with sufficient nutritional security which is otherwise unreachable for such segment. Currently the marine fisheries sector produces about 2.6 million tonnes (2003) of fish per annum. About 3 million people are employed in the primary, secondary and tertiary sector of marine fisheries which provides livelihood security to about 18 to 20 million people. (Sathiadhas, 2007)

Fisheries development is a state subject in India, but, centre promotes fisheries development through state level programme planning and implementation units. The development plans for the fisheries sector have been aiming at fish production and promoting export. India is blessed with vast and varied fishery resources with great

Conflicts in Fisheries: Partnerships & Co-management Paradigms

Vipinkumar.V.P* and Shyam. S. Salim
Senior Scientist,
Socio- Economic Evaluation and Technology Transfer Division
Central Marine Fisheries Research Institute, Kochi
*E-mail: vipincmfri@gmail.com
potential in both coastal and inland areas. But, fisheries production is showing a depleting trend which is adversely affecting the livelihoods of fishers and making a large population vulnerable. Being the open access resource, stock assessment and irreplacable nature of abundance in stock, conflicts of various types become the part and parcel of the fisheries system in the country. To address the livelihood issue, government introduced regulatory mechanisms such as gear selectivity, seasonal area closures and regulations that control the fishing effort and catching. This is ‘top down government driven management approach’ through legislation. However, government managed models of management have proved to be unsuccessful as indicated by poor compliance of action and regulations resulting in crisis and adverse affects on the livelihood of fishers.

Conflicts in Capture Fisheries Sector : Marine & Inland fisheries

With regard to conflicts in capture fisheries sector, there are marine and inland fisheries sectors to be considered. In marine sector, each country has their jurisdiction up to 200Nm towards sea. In India concept of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) enacted during 1997. In dealing with management, protection and proper utilisation of living marine resources several conflicts has been raised.

Conflicts between India and neighbouring countries: Some examples

- Primarily arises from fishermen's violations of national jurisdiction while in the pursuit of fish. Fishermen are lacking navigational devices which can forewarn fisherman from trespassing their jurisdiction.
- Political problem between India-Pakistan and Tamil problem causing tensions between India-Sri Lanka.
- Fishermen in Okha in Gujarat accidentally trespassing Indian jurisdiction being caught by Pak navy patrols.
- Fishermen in Rameshwaran in T.N. being caught by Sri Lankan navy.
- Conflicts over marine fisheries India and Bangladesh are rather rare.

Conflicts between states: Some examples

Conflicts occur mainly between southwestern states and south eastern states. (Goa, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Kerala.) It essentially is because of differential fishing ban period during monsoon. There is no demarked boundary between states in the marine region. (Each state has their jurisdiction up to 12 nm towards sea)

Conflicts between fishermen using two levels of technology

- Large scale industrial fishing vessel and small scale fishing vessel.
- Inshore and deep sea fishing vessel.
- Trawlers and Purse-seiners.

Today there seems to be change in the direction of conflicts.

Regional conflicts between fishermen

- Between fishermen from one state to the other.
- Between fishermen from one harbour to the other.

Conflicts between fishermen and industries: Example:

- Mangalore coast is conspicuously noted for conflicts of fisherfolk with industries.
Inland Fisheries: accounted the conflicts in reservoir fisheries and riverine fisheries.
Culture Fisheries Sector (Aquaculture)

Social conflicts and aquaculture

- Growth of carp culture has led to the conversion of paddy fields to fish ponds.
- Affected poor people who depend on their staple food (cereal).
- Government of A.P. imposed a tax on water use for aquaculture.
- Shrimp farmer and village people.
- Effect of dykes.
- Effect of ponds around creeks.
- Salinization problem

Conflicts between the shrimp farmers and fishermen

The shrimp farms do not provide access to the beach for traditional fishermen who have to reach the sea from the village.

A typology of fishery conflicts

In most fisheries, there appears to be little space available to increase long-term sustainable fishery benefits simply by increasing production. The fishery policy tools are generally limited to

1) Increasing the efficiency of harvesting and of management.
2) Making allocation (distributing) decisions, particularly determining who has the privilege of access to the fish available for capture.

Despite superficial appearances of chaos, the wide range of fishery conflicts (of both the efficiency and allocation varieties) can be organized into a relatively small number of categories, under for inter-related headings.

(1) Fishery Jurisdiction: Involving fundamental conflicts over the who ‘owns’ the fishery, who controls access to it, has is the optimal form of fishery management, and what should be the role played by governments in the fishery system.

(2) Management mechanisms: concerning relatively short-term issues arising in the development and implementation of fishery management plans, typically involving fishers/governments in the fishery system.

(3) Internal allocation: involving conflicts arising within the specific fishery system, between different user groups and rear types, as well as between fishers, processors and other players.

(4) External allocation: incorporating the wide range of conflicts arising between internal fishery players and outsiders, including foreign fleets, aquaculturists, non-fish industries (such as tourism and forestry) and indeed the public at large.

Conflicting fishery paradigms:

While the above typology categorises fishery conflicts, the real roots of the conflicts which lie in the underlying systematic differences in priorities pursued by the various fisheries players are to be given prime consideration. For example, everyone wants their fishery to be efficient, but the real meaning of this pleasant-sounding goal depends
entirely on the desired objectives which in turn vary widely with the philosophy and ideology of the fishery players. (Anthony, 1992)

![Diagram of paradigms]

**Fig 39.1 Conflicts among the community**

Conflicts and wars related to the rights over the use of land and water have been important human issues throughout recorded history. Although many of us are probably more aware of wars fought over religious freedom, political ideologies and social issues, conflicts over fishing rights and resources are just as common, if less reported. Since the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) were established in the 1970s, disputes have become more frequent and more violent than ever before. Due to the establishment of EEZs, access to the world's oceans has been radically reorganized and the access rights of foreign fishing vessels have been curtailed. Negotiations, international fisheries agreements (such as those between European and African countries), and recourse to an international tribunal have sometimes succeeded in resolving conflicts.

Conflict between Philippines and China is essentially due to over access to territorial waters. Thousands of Indonesian fishers have been incapacitated as a result of illegal fishing in Australian waters. While sovereignty issues are generally at the root of such conflicts, they are also the manifestation of competition for access to fish stocks, in coastal waters as much as on the high seas. In addition, the use of flags of convenience serves to exacerbate the problem. The country where a boat is registered does not necessarily identify its country of origin, and this loophole enables fishing companies to flout international fishing and labor conventions with impunity.

**Paradigm shift in fisheries governance**

There is an extreme necessity to have a paradigm shift in governance of fisheries which enables resource users (communities and fishers) and stakeholders participation at all levels as effective partners in the management process. Management regimes as remedy cover Partnerships, Co-operation, Leasing (Aquaculture) and Co-management paradigms.

Partnership and Co-operations through Fisheries co-operatives and Self Help Groups mobilized in marine fisheries sector do play a vital role in sustainable fisheries management. (Vipinkumar, 2005). Leasing essentially occurs with regard to aquaculture sector. Let's have a look into the policy and programmes for aquaculture development in India.

The registration of open water body farms and government leasing determines the appropriate areas for Mariculture activity, allocating the rights to use the resource and
evaluation of environmental impacts based on certain principles to be considered to frame the Mariculture policy. (Mohamed and Kripa, 2010, Radhakrishnan and Dineshbabu, 2011)

1. Common Property use conflicts: Policy guided by: Use of open water bodies for navigation and fishing should not be hindered by Mariculture. Similarly, Mariculture activities in open water bodies should not cause disturbances to other users. Permitted Mariculture by the state should be afforded complete protection of structure and stock kept in the open water bodies.

2. Carrying capacity: Open water bodies have limits to biological productions and such limits should be defined by the state in consultation with research institutions.

3. Environmental Protection: The polluter pays principle enacted by the CAAI should be applicable to pen water bodies so as to minimise environmental impacts. Pre and Post EIA (Environmental Impact Assessment) is mandatory.

4. Conservation: Aquatic ecosystems are very sensitive to changes caused by human activities and hence all activities should take into consideration conservation of aquatic biodiversity.

5. Zonation: Since Mariculture in open water bodies diverse and region specific, states have to draw-up zonation plans in GIS formats with the help research institutions. Creation of Mariculture parks should be encouraged.

**Partnerships and Co-management Paradigms**

There are success stories in Asia pacific region where the alternative models have been able to take care of all the parameters of sustainability. One of such fisheries management approaches, as an alternative to the top down government management approach is ‘co-management’. This is a partnership arrangement in which the community of local resource users (fishers), government and other stakeholders share the responsibility and authority for the management of fisheries through consultations and negotiations as regards to their roles, responsibilities and rights resulting in development of effective partnerships. This ensures sustainability of the resources as well as improving the livelihood of fishers.

**Fisheries Co-management**

Fisheries co-management is defined as an arrangement where responsibility for resource management is shared between the government and user groups (Nielsen et al, 2004). It is considered to be one solution to the growing problems of resource over-exploitation. If the regime is both to be effective and legitimate, introducing a co-management arrangement, which can be defined as a dynamic partnership using the capacity and interest of user-groups complemented by the ability of the fisheries administration to provide enabling legislation? Co-management is also a mean to reorganizing the fisheries management system. Co-management is -from this perspective-an institutional process of integrating and reallocating management responsibilities and competence (legal power) among participants by sharing the costs deriving from fisheries management with the users. Fisheries co-management is based on the following hypothesis.

The involvement and participation of user-groups create incentives for cooperation in order to formulate and implement more efficient, equal and sustainable management schemes which would benefit all parties.

Co-management provides some sense of ownership to the fish resources, which makes the user groups far more responsible for obtaining long-term sustainability of the fish resources. It might also be more cost-efficient in terms of administration. Enforcement
than centralized systems, but administration costs may increase in a co-management system, as the process may be rather time consuming, involving several interest groups.

Co-management is often referred to as relations between fishermen and the national administration including fisheries research institutions, mainly concerning regulation methods, quota allocation and stock assessment. However, co-management can also be perceived in relation to market activities, whereby relations between fishermen and buyers come in focus. As market dynamics become more important to fishing activities, it can be expected that coordination of market performance and fisheries management measures will be increasingly important.

Co-management is a set of institutional and organizational arrangements (rights and rules), which determine how the fisheries administration and user-groups cooperate. A co-management arrangement is not a static legal structure of rights and rules, but a dynamic process of creating new institutional structures. A co-management institution can therefore be designed as an entirely new institution or can be based on already established institutional structures. The latter might often be the case in fisheries, where co-management institutions usually evolve as incremental user-group involvement in certain management tasks. The devolution of authority to manage the fisheries, away from the fisheries administration to user-groups, may be one of the most difficult tasks of co-management. On the one hand, the fisheries administration may be reluctant to relinquish their authority, or portions of it, and are often opposed to decentralization. On the other hand, user-groups may neither have the aspiration nor the capabilities to undertake enhanced fisheries management responsibilities.

Advantages of approaching fisheries management as a bottom-up process versus the traditional centralized top-down system may be a high degree of acceptability and compliance with regulation measures, due to the participation of user-groups in the decision-making and implementation process. Once user groups are involved in the decision making and implementation of fisheries management, a spectrum of co-management arrangements can be identified. The figures illustrate the various types of institutional set-up for different co-management arrangements.

In the instructive type, there is only minimal exchange of information between government and users. This type of co-management regime is only different from centralised management in the sense that the mechanisms exist for dialogue with users, but
the process itself tends to be government informing users on the decisions they plan to make.

Co-management can be an innovative change to the modern fisheries management approach as it implies a power sharing arrangement between government and fishing communities to undertake fisheries management. However, the practical adaptation by governments of the co-management approach has most often been limited to involving fishing communities in the implementation process—an ‘instrumental co-management’ approach.

Socio-economic considerations are likely to play a more prominent role within an empowering co-management arrangement. Empowerment of fishing communities is a mechanism to give the people within the fishing communities a chance to influence their own future in order to cope with the impact from globalisation; competing use of freshwater and coastal environments; and other fisheries related issues.

The empowering co-management approach is a demanding concept, as it requires:

- A rethink of the logic for management and subsequently a change in the knowledge base for management.
- A major restructuring of the institutional and organisational arrangements supporting management.
- A substantial change in attitudes from both governments and fishing communities towards their role in such arrangements.
- Aspiration from fishing communities and government to proceed along this avenue.
- Capacity building at several levels both within government and fishing communities.
Co-management for Fisheries Conservation and Livelihood

- Competitive Fishing needs to be replaced by cooperative fishing to avoid depletion and ultimate extinction of several varieties of our marine flora and fauna
- Fishery resources are renewable but not inexhaustible
- Cooperative fishing minimizes capital investment vis-à-vis cost of production, sustainability of resources and maximizes the earnings and profit
- Cooperative marketing enhances the efficiency of distribution channel and enhances the earnings of real producers

Common property: Management issues

- Common property means no one is having ownership: hence no –management
- The literature on property rights identifies different ideal analytical types of property rights regimes:
  - State property: with sole government jurisdiction and centralized regulatory controls;
  - Private property: with privatization of rights through the establishment of individual or Company-held ownership;

Co-management: Theoretical Framework

- Co-management is a new alternative management approach with a human face.
- Co-management is an effective process for the collective governance of common property resources.
- Co-operative management or co-management of fisheries can be defined as a partnership arrangement in which the community of local resource users (fishers), government, other stakeholders (boat owners, fish traders, boat builders, business people, etc.) and external agents (non-governmental organizations (NGOs), academic and research institutions) share the responsibility and authority for the management of the fishery.
- The substance of sharing of responsibility and authority will be negotiated between community members and government and be within the boundaries of government policy.
- The term 'community' can have several meanings. Community can be defined geographically by political or resource boundaries or socially as a community of individuals with common interests
- A community is not necessarily a village, and a village is not necessarily a community. Care should also be taken not to assume that a community is a homogeneous unit, as there will often be different interests in a community, based on gender, class, ethnic and economic variations.
- Co-management should be viewed not as a single strategy to solve all problems of fisheries management, but rather as a process of resource management, maturing, adjusting and adapting to changing conditions over time. A healthy co-management process will change over time in response to changes in the level of trust, credibility, legitimacy and success of the partners and the whole co-management arrangement.
- Co-management is also called participatory, joint, stakeholder, multi-party or collaborative management.
- Co-management sharing and decentralization. It attempts to overcome the distrust, corruption, involves aspects of democratization, social empowerment, power fragmentation and inefficiency of existing fisheries management arrangements through collaboration.
Partnerships, roles and responsibilities are pursued, strengthened and redefined at different times in the co-management process, depending on the needs and opportunities.

The process may include formal and or informal organizations of fishers and other stakeholders.

Fisheries co-management can be classified into five broad types according to the roles government and fishers play (Sen and Nielsen, 1996):

1. Instructive: There is only minimal exchange of information between government and fishers. This type of co-management regime is only different from centralized management in the sense that the mechanisms exist for dialogue with users, but the process itself tends to be government informing fishers on the decisions they plan to make.

2. Consultative: Mechanisms exist for government to consult with fishers but all decisions are taken by government.

3. Cooperative: This type of co-management is where government and fishers cooperate together as equal partners in decision-making.

4. Advisory: Fishers advise government of decisions to be taken and government endorses these decisions.

5. Informative: Government has delegated authority to make decisions to fisher groups who are responsible for informing government of these decisions.

Through co-management, equity and social justice in fisheries management is sought. Equity and social justice is brought about through empowerment and active participation in the planning and implementation of fisheries co-management. The mutuality of interests and the sharing of responsibility among and between partners will help to narrow the distance between resource managers and fishers, bringing about closer compatibility of the objectives of management.

The overall prospects for co-management are good in the Philippines, Cambodia, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Mozambique, Zambia, South Africa, Malawi and Kenya.

The Stakeholder analysis

Other than fishers, stakeholders (individuals, groups or organizations who are in one way or another interested, involved or affected (positively or negatively) by a particular action) that derive economic benefit from the resource (for example, boat owners, fish traders, business suppliers, police, politicians, consumers) should also be considered in co-management and the stakeholder analysis can help to identify those stakeholders who should be included in co-management.

A Case study of Co-management in Indian context

There has been an interesting sharing of ideas in recent issues of SAMUDRA Report on the experiences and principles of co-management. All over the world, fisher communities are trying desperately to safeguard their access to fish resources, while, at the same time, being driven to catch more in order to keep afloat. The fishers of the Saurashtra coast of Gujarat, one of the foremost fish-producing States of India, are no exception, as a result of the study undertaken on “The Impact of Development on Human Population Dynamics and the Ecosystem” in three locations of the west coast of India, with the help of a grant from the McArthur Foundation. (Nalini and Vijayan, 2007)

One of the study locations was the large fishing harbour town of Veraval in Gujarat. The findings of the study were rather revealing, not only regarding the nature of the decline of the overcapitalized trawl fishery, but also the poor environmental and social indicators in
a place that had a booming fishery for over 25 years through the 1980s and 1990s. In the community feedback workshops held in 2005, people were also taken aback by the findings of the study for a while and they were aware that their fishery was on the downswing, they felt challenged to realize that a large number of the children of the community were not in school, that there was a fall in the female sex ratio, and that there was a rise in the levels of morbidity and demands for dowry at marriages. As a community that is basically business-oriented and with a desire to simultaneously claim progress, they found themselves in a prisoner’s dilemma. A challenge of seeking a way out by the project authorities made them interact with them on a longer-term basis.

The fishery in the area is a trawl fishery along a 40-km coastline between the two fishing harbours of Veraval and Mangrol, which account for a third of the fish catches of Gujarat. There is also a vibrant hodi fishery of fiberglass-reinforced plastic (FRP) beach-landing craft, interspersed with the trawlers. Authorities got intensively involved in the fishing harbour/community of Mangrol as the community has traditionally been well organized. They were also fortunate to get a local team that the local community agreed to host. In preparation for the work, an intensive training programme was organized for the team. There were also four representatives from Mangrol and Veraval, selected by the community, who participated in the programme. They actually represented the trawl fishery.

Initiating change

Project people did not initially mind this fact as it was this sector that they thought had to be involved in initiating any change in resource management. The boat owners were intensely involved in the training programme and, during the subsequent period, they turned out to be the main agents of change in the community. Besides developing an analysis of the fisheries crisis, they were most intrigued by the connections made to the fall in the female sex ratio, the number of school-age dropouts, the high morbidity rates, and the extensive pollution of water bodies, all in a context where the communities were well organized but totally in the hands of men. The inputs on gender analysis and the patriarchal development paradigm helped them to see the negative side of male-dominated communities, where women have no voice, and, as a consequence, the issues of potable water, sanitation and health receive no priority. In fact, the community organizations had seen to it that entry into the trawl fishery was limited to members of the same caste. Yet just as these caste organizations camouflaged disparities in the community, they were unable to manage the manner in which investments were made in the fishery, which, in turn, aggravated the growing disparities.

The fishery in the area has been kept afloat by, on the one hand, State subsidies on diesel and, on the other, by the opening up of export markets and the development of surimi plants. It is otherwise an extremely inefficiently run trawl fishery, which has also contributed to the massive pollution in the harbours. But the government has gradually begun to be less lenient on the diesel subsidies, certain export consignments have been rejected by some importing countries, and the government has begun giving greater importance to developing coastal resources other than fisheries. The fishing communities, therefore, needed to get their act together and think differently about their fishery and its future if they did continue to consider the fishery as a means of livelihood.

Strategies to tackle this problem were developed at the training programme, and a plan was drawn up to set up a coastal area managing council in a year as well as push for co-management of the fisheries. The first step was to develop a general awareness in the community about the inter-relationships among the ocean, the land and the people so that
people understand how these affect one another. This was done at several levels through all kinds of community programmes but the strategy in the first year was to:

- Develop a forum for women where they could discuss and understand these issues and, at the same time, create a collective to gradually represent their cause and themselves in the community organization (samatj);

- Create an awareness among the youth and children about the coast and oceans; and widen the understanding of the fishers themselves regarding coastal-area issues, and relate these to their fisheries-management possibilities. For this, efforts were made to also include the elected representatives of the municipality in discussions related to these issues so that they would be taken into consideration in town planning.

The most interesting results were from an active group of women fish vendors who pressured the municipality and the fisheries department for a better fish market, while another group made a detailed study of the community’s problems relating to water, sanitation and attendant infrastructure, which was presented to the members of the samaj. In both these cases, the community’s men were very responsive and open to the idea that women could also be part of the co-management process.

The discussions on co-management were done separately for the fishing sectors, the community organizations and the women so that all of them could understand the issues and felt free to raise doubts and make suggestions from the point of view of their own sectors. It was clear that there were several areas of conflict.

After the discussions, all the representatives got together to discuss the possibility of a larger plan and who would finally meet the government and scientists to make the proposed presentation on co-management. Importantly, it was the first time that women and men from various sectors, caste and religious groupings had got together to discuss coastal and fisheries issues.

In August 2007, an Expert Consultation on Fisheries and Area Co-management was held in Ahmedabad, the capital of Gujarat, supported by the Fish Code Programme of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), where the State’s entire fisheries department was present, together with scientists from the Central Marine Fisheries Institute (CMFRI), the Central Institute of Fisheries Technology (CIFT) and the Fisheries Survey of India (FSI), as well as trader, processor and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the Marine Products Export Development Authority (MPEDA).

The community leaders first presented their ideas on co-management, which included both the need for fisheries management and coastal-area management, and articulated why they thought that this was a viable option in their particular context. They requested the government to create a framework of legislation for co-management, where both their rights to the coastal resources and the responsibilities of the government and the various stakeholders would be clearly defined. Subsequently, the experts responded, and a group discussion followed on the action that could be taken. An interesting and heated discussion between the trawl-boat owners, the scientists and the government officials had even the women chipping in, but unfortunately the hodi owners remained silent.

The importance of this process has to do with the fact that co-management was proposed by the community representatives from a shore-based fisheries perspective and not a fishing perspective alone. This was possible because of the data available and the focus on the fishery as a means of livelihood that has to be sustained. But this is not an easy
process and it still has to be operationalized. The bank on the tremendous amount of goodwill shown by all the stakeholders, indicates that the stakes in actually managing the fisheries are high.

Conflict resolution though Sui-generis co-management: A case study of ‘Kadakkody’ in Kerala

Kadakkody: A linguistic aberration of the Malayalam word ‘Kadal-kodathy’ literally meaning sea court. It has legislative, executive and judiciary roles to play in the Araya and Dheevera communities of Hindu fishermen belonging to Kasargod district of Kerala. Kadakkodies make their presence felt strongly in four regions like Kasargod, Kizhoor, Kodikkulam and Bakkalam. It plays as a community based fisheries management institution. Though functional only in a few pockets of north Malabar coast of Kerala, these age old institutions are similar to many of the Caste Panchayats prevalent in rural India. (Ramchandran, 2004).

Constitution of kadakkody: Each kadakkody is an adjunct to the temple of the fishermen community in each village. Ruling deity in all these temples is Kurumba Bhagavathy who is considered the most worshipped ‘mother goddess’ (Devi) among Hindu fisherfolk. Each kadakkody has three distinct bodies (1) Sthanikan (the permanently authorized), (2) kadavanmar/Sahayiies (temple messengers or assistant priest and they represent the police) and (3) Temple committee.

Sthanikans are composed for 4 separate constitutional groups namely Karnavanmar (4 members) Achanmar (6 members), Kodakaran (1 member) and Anthithiriyan (2 members). Karnavanmar are the high priests of the temple and they act as magistrates belonging to 4 illams such as chempillam, kachillam, karillam and ponnillam. Achanmar are six in number and are basically oracles (velichapadan) at the temple and are assistant magistrates. Kadavanmar are the messengers/police. Temple committee is a democratically elected body. The factors determining the legitimacy of kadakkody are divine authority, social embeddedness, systematic procedures and behavioural norms, participatory and transparent process, quick and fair judgements, functional diversity, shared sense of pride etc.

Typological differentiation of 2 forms of co-management: (Ramchandran, 2004)

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<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
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<th>State induced/supported CBCRM</th>
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<td>Basis of legitimacy</td>
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<td>Group of homogeneity</td>
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<td>Compliance</td>
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<td>Ethos</td>
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<td>Norms</td>
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Perspectives and challenges ahead

Pertinent studies of various co-management implementations have revealed potentials and benefits of co-management, but also many unresolved issues and problems that need to be addressed. There is still a long way to go before a general understanding of various co-management systems and examples of solutions to all the major problems are available. A range of issues and problems need to be addressed: Developing co-management institutions on a larger scale than the local community: Many of the problems and issues facing fisheries can only be solved on a provincial, national or even international level. The resource systems on which fisheries rely are in most cases too large to be entirely within control of a few communities, and fisheries management institutions must therefore be able to address problems of resource access and sharing on that level. The solution to this scale problem may be representation within nested systems, but this raises a new set of problems relating to mechanisms to ensure genuine representivity and to avoid a new process of alienation between communities and management is initiated. Reconciling local and global agendas: International agreements on fisheries and environmental management are a special case of incongruence between scales. Means must be developed by which the governments can serve the double obligation of attending to international agreements while sharing power in setting objectives for fisheries management with the communities. Identifying a knowledge base for management, which is considered valid by stakeholders: The knowledge base for fisheries management should relate to the objectives of management and be considered valid by the stakeholders? A co-management system must develop mechanisms to reconcile formal scientific knowledge and fishers' knowledge about their resource system in a way that maintains scientific validity and wide acceptance. There are no easy solutions to this problem. One approach may be to identify indicators of the status of the resource system that are both supported by science and reflects fishers' observations. Developing approaches to manage conflicts between resource users who have acquired exclusion rights to a resource through the co-management process and those who are excluded: There is a need to understand the mechanisms and actual reasons behind the alienation process of the different user groups in order to manage these conflicts. Developing appropriate approaches for empowering local communities to participate in the setting of management objectives through institutional reform: This may require substantial change in the way management authorities function to provide fisheries management services and changes in perceptions of stakeholders on the roles of fisheries management agencies. These issues must be addressed in practice—in practical experiments with co-management. It is however important that such experiments are documented and the experiences communicated to others who may be in the process of establishing or developing co-management arrangements. It is therefore an inevitable requisite that attempts to implement co-management are associated with independent research to document and disseminate the experiences.